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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MILDRED N. CORNWELL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
RAY H. BARTON, 




STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff who was a guest 
of defendant's tenant, to recover for personal in-
juries claimed to have been sustained when she fell 
on a walkway owned by defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff has appealed from a judgment enter-
ed in favor of defendant on a jury finding of no 
negligence. The case had been previously tried to a 
court and jury. The defendant prevailed and plain-
tiff was granted a new trial. The appeal is from 
the results of the retrial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks to have the judgment entered 
on the jury verdict affirmed. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant accepts plaintiff's Statement of 
Facts except as modified in his argument and in 
those instances where plaintiff has omitted certain 
facts, or his statement of them deviates materially 
from the record. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 9 DID NOT CON-
STITUTE A DIRECTED VERDICT, NOR WAS IT A 
FORMULA INSTRUCTION. 
Plaintiff finds two objections to the court's in-
struction No. 9, which is a modification of defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 5. First, she cam-
plains that it is in effect a directed verdict, and 
second, that it is a formula instruction and fails to 
contain the theories of both parties. Each of these 
matters will be discussed separately. 
1. The Instruction is not in form or effect a 
directed verdict. 
It should be noted that the plaintiff in attempt-
ing to prove her case developed, both on direct and 
on cross-examination, considerable testimony in an 
apparent attempt to show that the ice was present 
for a sufficient length of time to have reasonably 
permitted Mr. and Mrs. Davis, defendant's custo-
dians, to discover and remedy the condition, and 
further, that the snow had been on the ground for 
a sufficient length of time to have reasonably per-
mitted Mr. and Mrs. Davis to have removed the 
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same. In this connection the plaintiff testified that 
there was snow on the ground when she awakened 
between 8 :00 and 9 :00 A.M. the morning of the 
accident, having observed the weather conditions 
from her window (R. 88). She claimed that it had 
snowed during the night and that it quit snowing 
between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. the morning of thea.cQ.1Je_n{, 
P> Davis indicated that she arose at 6 :30 a.m. on the 
morning of the accident and observed no snow on 
the walks ( R. 159). When she left for a Relief So-
ciety Meeting at 9 :30 a.m. there was no snow on 
the walks and it was not snowing. However, when 
she returned from the meeting between 11 :30 a.m. 
and 12 : 00 noon, it was snowing lightly ( R. 160). 
After arriving home, she changed her clothes, fixed 
lunch for her daughter and herself and was in the 
process of sweeping a light skiff of snow from the 
walks between 1 :00 p.m. and 1 :30 p.m., when she 
was called to the telephone and advised of plaintiff's 
accident ( R. 161). Mr. Davis said there was no 
snow on the walks when he left for work at 7 :40 
a.m. ( R. 150). The procedures with respect to car-
ing for the walks in relation to ice and snow were 
also placed in evidence by the plaintiff ( R. 154, 
155). Detailed weather reports were also introduced 
in evidence (Exhibit 4-P). 
Plaintiff built her case upon the accumulation 
of both snow and ice on the walkways and the care 
that was exercised by Mr. and Mrs. Davis in main-
taining them. The jury was entitled to know that 
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ice formed as a result of natural weather condi-
tions, as opposed to artificially created conditions, 
could not be charged to the responsibility of defend-
ant or his employees. Further, if the presence of 
ice, was not revealed by newly fallen snow, such 
did not constitute negligence on the part of the de-
fendant. The instruction, as given, simply goes to 
the question of negligence of defendant, if any, in 
permitting the accumulation of ice and snow. The in-
struction properly leaves open for determination by 
the jury, whether or not the ice, if found to have been 
present, should have been discovered before the new 
snow fell, or 'if other duties to the plaintiff, as de-
fined by the Court, had been violated. The Court fully 
advised the jury of a property owner's responsibili-
ties to tenants and their guests in Instruction 9A 
(Plain tiff's Requested Instruction No. 2) ( R. 9), 
which immediately fallowed the instruction to which 
exception is now taken. Instruction No. 9A reads as 
follows: 
"You are instructed that it is the duty 
of a landlord to exercise ordinary care in 
maintaining in a reasonably safe condition 
all parts of the premises over which he re-
tains control, and which are used in common 
by all the tenants and their guests. A viol~­
tion of said duty subjects the landlord to l~­
ability to a tenant or guest injured as a proxi-
mate result of such violation. 
"In this respect, you are instructed that 
Ray H. Barton, the owner of the premises in-
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valved in this case, had the duty: 
"l. To exercise ordinary care so as to 
maintain common walkways in a reasonably 
safe condition for tenants and guests and had 
the further duty to observe any existing dan-
gerous condition known to him or by use of 
reasonable diligence would have become known 
to him, which, in the exercise of ordinary 
care would not be discovered by said tenants 
and guests. 
"2. To remedy or remove any such dan-
gerous con di ti on. 
"If you should find from a preponder-
ance of the evidence that defendant was guilty 
of negligence in either or both of the above 
particulars, you should so answer the ques-
tions hereinafter to be submitted to you." 
The Court's Instruction No. 10 (Plaintiff's Re-
quested Instruction No. 3), further advised the jury 
that if they should find that Mr. and Mrs. Davis 
were negligent, at the time in question in either or 
both of the particulars referred to in Instruction 
No. 9, that their negligence was then to be imputed 
to and became the negligence of the defendant. 
The plaintiff does not, nor can she claim any 
deficiency in Instruction No. 9A, as not fully set-
ting forth the duties of a property owner towards 
the guest of a tenant. Had Instruction No. 9 been 
given without the Instruction No. 9A, the jury 
would, of course, not have been fully advised of the 
responsibility of defendant toward his tenants and 
their £ruests. Because of the evidence which had been 
0 
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submitted in the case, the court properly deter-
mined that it was necessary to place the questions 
concerning the accumulation of ice and snow in 
proper prospective for the jury (R. 190). 
This court has repeatedly announced the rule 
that all instructions are to be considered and read 
together. A specific instruction concerning this was 
given by the Court as Instruction No. 29, which read 
as follows: 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 29 
"These instructions, though numbered 
separately, are to be considered and construed 
by you as one connected whole. Each instruc-
tion should be read and understood with ref-
erence to and as a part of the en tire charge 
and not as though one instruction separately 
was intended to present the whole of the case 
upon any particular point. For that reason 
you are not to single out any certain sentence 
or any individual point or instruction and ig-
nore the others, but you are to consider all 
the instructions, as a whole, and to regard 
each in the light of all the others." 
This well accepted principle has been repeat- , 
edly affirmed by this Court. Startin v. Madsen, 120 
Ut. 631, 237 P.2d 834 ( 1951), Walkenhorst v. Kes-
ler, 92 Ut. 312, 67 P.2d 654 (1937), Haywood v. 
Rio Grande Railway, 6 Ut. 2d 155, 307 P.2d 1045 
(1957). 
Further, the failure to state the law fully and 
completely in one instruction in the light of other 
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instructions is not prejudicial error. Taylor v. Weber 
County, 4 Ut. 2d 328, 293 P.2d 925 ( 1956). The 
instructions must be read in light of the whole 
charge in determining whether a particular instruc-
tion was calculated to mislead the jury. Martin v. 
Sheffield, 112 Ut. 478, 189 P.2d 127 ( 1948). 
Plaintiff's argument that the instruction "eli-
minates entirely any duty whatsoever to inspect, 
discover and remove accumulations of ice, regard-
less of how long and how notorious the existence of 
the same" (Plaintiff's Brief p. 9), when considered 
in light of her own instruction No. 9A, and other 
instructions given by the Court defining the duties 
of the parties and the manner in which the instruc-
tions were to be considered by the jury, is unsound. 
2. The Instruction is not a formula instruc-
tion. 
Plaintiff's additional complaint with instruc-
tion No. 9 is that it is a formula instruction because 
it fails to include plaintiff's theory that "defendant 
failed to exercise ordinary care to discover and rem-
edy the dangerous condition." Plaintiff cites Ivie 
v. Richardson, 9 Ut. 2d 5, 336 P.2d 781 (1959), 
as authority that the giving of Instruction No. 9 
constitutes reversible error. 
The instruction given in the present case is not 
a formula instruction. The condemned instruction 
in the Ivie case recited certain facts, which if found 
by the jury would constitute negligence, and then 
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directed the jury if they so found " ... your ve1'-
dict must be in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendant." The instruction failed to contain 
any reference to contributory negligence which was 
an issue in the case. 
The Court left unanswered in the I vie case 
whether the giving of such a "formula instruction" 
constituted reversible error. Plaintiff need not have 
resorted to general law texts in an attempt to de-
fine Utah law in this regard for it is fully set forth 
in the recent case of Ortega vs. Thomas, 14 Ut. 
2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 ( 1963), which was either 
ignored or overlooked by the plaintiff. The instruc-
tion in the Ortega case was to the effect that if the 
jury found the defendant negligent, and that it 
proximately:'~aused plaintiff's injury" ... you should 
determine the damages sustained by the plaintiff 
... " The issue of contributory negligence was not 
contained in that instruction but was contained in 
a separate one. 
In determining that this did not constiute re-
versible error, the Court said: 
"Defendant argues that the giving of In-
structions Nos. 12 and 14 ref erred to above, 
separately and without correlating them, 
would confuse the jury, citing the case of Ivie 
v. Richardson. It is true that we there voiced 
some criticism of similar instructions. In re-
gard to that case, and its possible application 
here, these observations should be made. The 
criticism was also leveled at another fault. 
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The instruction regarding negligence ended 
with the phrase, 'then your verdict must be 
in favor of the plaintiff and against the de-
fendant.' Aware that instructions in that 
form, often ref erred to as 'formula' instruc-
tions, sometimes occur over and over again in 
requests for instructions, or in some instances 
in instructions actually given by the court, we 
observed that the instructions in that form 
are undesirable because they tend to be par-
tial and argumentive. It will be noted that 
the criticism was in mild language, stating 
that 'It is better to avoid giving such instruc-
tions,' and went on to say, 'of more import-
ance is the (next) error assigned * * * '. 
While we think the criticism is justified, and 
we reiterate it, the reversal was not placed 
solely on that ground. On the other hand, there 
is precedent for refusing to do so." 
The Court then stated that since the trial court 
had given an appropriate instruction advising the 
jury that they should not single out any particular 
instruction and give it undue importance, but con-
sirler them altogether, no error was committed. As 
previously noted the court gave such a cautionary 
instruction in the present case (Instruction No. 29, 
R. 63). 
Instruction No. 9 is not a formula instruction. 
It correctly defines the responsibility of a landlord 
for natural accumulations of ice and snow under 
the factual issues of this case. That is all it pro-
fessed to do. 
The case of Konold vs. The Rio Grande West-
9 
ern Railway Cornpany, 21 Utah 379, 60 P. 1021 
( 1900), cited by the plaintiff is not helpful here. 
That case dealt with the inconsistent or contradic-
tory instructions given on a material issue in a case. 
There was no inconsistency between Instruction No. 
9 as given by the court and any other instruction. 
It was merely explanatory of the law in the case. 
The plaintiff further claims that the error in 
giving instruction No. 9 was increased because an-
other instruction advised the jury that the defend-
ant was not a guarantor against the occurrence of 
accidents on his property. 
In Steele v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Ry. 
Co., 16 Ut. 2d 127, 130, 396 P.2d 751, 753 (1964), 
this court in denying a claim of error stated: 
". . . the owner of property is not to be 
regarded as an insurer for even an invitee 
upon his property. His duties toward invitees 
are limited to those risks which are unreason-
able . . . which he has no reason to believe 
such persons will discover or realize the risk 
involved . . . and which he has no reason to 
anticipate that persons acting with ordinary 
and reasonable care will encounter ... " 
The instructions in the present case properly 
advised the jury of the law concerning the duties 
of the defendant as a landowner and his responsi-
bility with respect to the natural accumulation of 
ice and snow on walkways. Instruction No. 9 was 
necessary to define that duty because it had become 
a prominent part of plaintiff's case. It did not 
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amount to a directed verdict but was a definition 
of responsibility and when read with the other in-
structions was a proper statement of the law of the 
case. Further, the instruction was not a formula in-
struction in form or substance. The theory of the 
defendant was fully set forth in other instructions 
which he requested and were given by the court. 
POINT II. 
THE SUBMISSION OF UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT 
IN INSTRUCTION NO. 5 WAS NOT ERROR. 
Instruction No. 5 is verbatim JIFU Instruc-
tion 16.1. The identical instruction was given and ap-
proved in Porter v. Price, 11 Ut. 2d 80, 84, 355 
P.2d 66 ( 1960). In that case the defendant's auto-
mobile went out of control when defendant suffered 
a severe insulin shock. No evidence was presented 
that he had conducted himself other than as a rea-
sonably "well-regulated diabetic." He had no pre-
vious warning symptoms. The plaintiff claimed it 
was error for the court to give an instruction on 
unavoidable accident. The following language is 
taken from the opinion : 
"However, there are some situations 
where the evidence is susceptible of being so 
interpreted that an accident occurred without 
negligence on the part of anyone, and if it is 
reasonably susceptible of such interpretation, 
and a party requests it, the trial court com-
mits no error in so advising the jury." 
Also, of significance in the Porter case is the 
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discussion of the Utah Court concerning the Calif. 
ornia case of Biitigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal. 
2d 652, 320 P.2d 500, 65 A.L.R. 2d 1, upon which 
plaintiff relies heavily in assigning error in the giv-
ing of the unavoidable accident instruction in the 
present case. (See Plaintiff's Brief Page 16). 
Of significance is the fact that the plaintiff 
has failed to cite one Utah case dealing with the 
question of unavoidable accident, although as will 
be observed, there are several which have dealt with 
this question. The cases cited by Plaintiff will be 
considered first and then reference will be made 
to several Utah cases. 
The Utah Court in discussing the Butigan case 
noted that the California court condemned the un-
avoidable accident instruction in part because it 
was misleading in suggesting to the jury that they 
"should consider unavoidability as an issue or ground 
of defense separate and apart from the questions of 
negligence and proximate causation." It is inter-
esting to observe that the California Supreme Court 
has since reconsidered its decision in Butigan and 
has retracted considerably from the bold position 
taken in that case. In Pobor v. Western Pacific, 
55 Cal. 2d 314, 359 P.2d 474, 478, (Cal., 1961), 
that Court made these observations: 
"Question : Did the trial court commit 
prejudicial error in instructing the jury, at 
the request of the defendants: 
* * * 
( d) on unavoidable accident? 
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No. Although under Butigan v. Yellow Cab 
Company, 49 Cal. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 500, 65 
A.L.R. 2d 1, it is error to give an instruction 
upon unavoidable accident, still it is a ques-
tion for the appellate court to determine 
whether the giving of the instruction consti-
tuted prejudicial error." 
The lower court judgment was affirmed, there 
being no determination of prejudicial error. 
The plaintiff also cites the Oregon case of 
Fenton v. Aleshire, 238 Ore. 24, 393 P.2d 217 
( 1964), which followed the rationale of the Butigan 
case, in support of her claim of error in giving an 
unavoidable accident instruction. Although the Fen-
ton case held that an instruction on unavoidable 
accident should not be given in any case, two sub-
sequent cases decided by the Oregon Supreme Court 
held that the giving of such an instruction, although 
error, was not prejudicial. (See McBee v. Knight, 
239 Ore. 606, 398 P.2d 479 ( 1965), and Hills v. Mc-
Gillvrey, ____ Ore. ____ , 402 P.2d 722 ( 1965)). 
Plaintiff cites at page 21 of her Brief numer-
ous cases for the apparent purpose of sustaining 
her position that instructions on unavoidable acci-
dents are in disfavor with the courts. The Washing-
ton case of Bennett v. McCready, 57 Wash. 2d 317, 
356 P.2d 712 ( 1960), is one such case. However, in 
the later Washington case of Cooper v. Pay-N-Save 
Drugs, Inc., 59 Wash. 2d 829, 371 P.2d 43, the court 
reaffirmed its long standing position that it is proper 
to give such an instruction if the facts warrant it. 
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Plaintiff also cites the case of Carlb1trg v. Wes-
ley Hospital and Nurse Training School, 182 Kan. 
634, 323 P.2d 638 ( 1958), in favor of her position. 
In that case the plaintiff was injured when he fell 
out of defendant's hospital bed while he was under 
the influence of drugs and a patient at the hospital. 
The Court there merely held that the facts did not 
lend itself to an instruction on unavoidable accident 
because under the circumstances, the plaintiff was 
under the "complete" control of the hospital and its 
employees and there was nothing unavoidable about 
the accident. The Court recognized that such an 
instruction is proper where the occurrence is not 
contributed to by the negligent act or omission of 
either party. 
Although plaintiff characterizes the recent de-
cisions of Courts of other states as being the '''clear 
trend of authorities toward condemnation of un-
avoidable accident instructions in automobile colli-
sion cases" (emphasis added), it is evident from a 
review of those cases that even the California Court 
has retrenched from the position it appeared to take 
in the Butigan case. The Idaho Supreme Court in 
the 1964 case of Hackworth v. Davis, 87 Ida. 98, 390 
P.2d 422, refused to follow the California case in 
Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co. With few exceptions the 
Courts still recognize that in proper circumstances 
an unavoidable instruction is proper for the purpose 
of clarifying issues for the jury. The Utah Courts 
have consistently followed this procedure. 
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A case which is similar in many respects to the 
one at bar is Dennison v. Chapman, 6 Ut. 2d 379, 
382, 314 P.2d 838, 840 ( 1957). There plaintiff sued 
for injuries sustained when an automobile driven 
by him collided with a truck which had crossed into 
his lane of traffic after it was struck by the de-
fendant's automobile which suddenly spun out of 
control on icy roads as it was being passed by the 
truck. The Supreme Court sustained a dismissal of 
the case finding that there was sufficient evidence 
to justify a determination that the accident was not 
the result of anyone's negligence. 
The following language is taken from the opi-
mon: 
"To say that this type of accident could 
not happen except for negligence is specious. 
NI any tinies accidents are caused by icy con-
ditions beyond the control of any of the par-
ties involved. Likewise, the icy roads would 
remove the element of exclusive control from 
the defendants. A person cannot be in exclu-
sive control of a vehicle under weather con-
ditions in which the elements can act at vari-
ance with the control of the operator."(Em-
phasis added) 
The instant case is particularly suited to an in-
struction on unavoidable accident. As in the Denni-
son case, icy conditions were involved. Weather ob-
Yiously created conditions over which neither of the 
parties had any control. There was sufficient evi-
dence in the record which were reasonably susept-
i hle to a finding that neither the defendant nor the 
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plaintiff were negligent in the manner in which they 
conducted themselves. The jury was therefor pro-
perly advised that in certain situations legal respon-
sibility does not attach to either party. 
The present case clearly comes within that class 
of cases referred to in Porter v. Price, 11 Ut. 2d 
80, 355 P.2d 66 ( 1960). The Court there stated that 
if the evidence is reasonably susceptible to the in-
terpretation that the accident occurred without the 
negligence on the part of anyone, and if a party 
makes such a request, that the trial court commits no 
error in so advising the jury. See also Wellman v. , 
Noble, 12 Ut. 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961), where 
the Court again stated that in cases where the facts 
warrant doing so, it is not error to give an instruc-
tion on unavoidable accident, and Jensen v. Dolen, 
12 Ut. 2d 404, 367 P.2d 191 (1962). 
No cases are cited to the contrary by the plain- ; 
tiff, but she suggests that the Utah court follow 
the uncertain sound of the Butigan case. 
CONCLUSION 
Instruction No. 9 properly advised the jury 
concerning the responsibility of a landowner for 
natural accumulations of ice and snow upon pro-
perty controlled by him. The instruction was appro-
priate because of the prominence of evidence in-
troduced into the case by plaintiff concerning the 
alleged presence of ice and snow prior to, at, and 
subsequent to the time of the accident. The instruc-
16 
tion was not a formula instruction, and even if 
found to be such, did not constitute prejudicial error. 
The instruction given concerning unavoidable 
accident was particularly appropriate because there 
was evidence of weather conditions which was rea-
sonably susceptible to an interpretation by the jury 
that the accident occurred without negligence on the 
part of anyone. This court has consistently affirm-
ed such an instruction when given in easer similar 
to this one. The jury verdict should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN & 
MERLIN R. LYBBERT 
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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